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Abstract 
 
The paper discusses the reasons for the observed variation in the sequencing, speed and 
content of reform policies, in the 1990s, among 25 post-socialist countries of Central Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union.  It argues that these differences, while considerable in the early 
1990s, did not amount to as substantially different reform strategies as it was often claimed 
and, in any case, have for most countries narrowed down considerably in the second half of 
the 1990s.  The transformational recession is interpreted to have been of the stagflation type, 
related largely to initial, pre-reform crisis conditions.  The paper reviews macroeconomic 
policies and evaluates the progress which the 25 countries have made in terms of a set of 
criteria proposed for the purpose of such an evaluation, and it discusses the reasons which 
distinguish the more successful from the less successful.  The potential contribution to growth 
of the technological convergence (catching-up) factor during the first half of the 21st century 
is also estimated for key transition economies. 
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Macroeconomic Policies and Achievements in 
Transition Economies, 1989-1999 
 
 
Stanislaw Gomulka 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to consider and answer the following questions: 
 
?  How far have the transition economies of Central Europe (CE) and the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) been able to establish the macroeconomic framework needed for sustaining 
investment and economic growth? 
 
?  What distinguishes the more successful from the less successful:  initial conditions, the 
political environment, the state of institutions? 
 
?  How far have weak or missing institutions hampered effectual policy-making? 
 
?  Have macroeconomic policy dilemmas been intensified by weak institutions? 
 
?  Has too much emphasis been placed on lowering inflation – or reducing it too rapidly – at 
the expense of economic growth? 
 
?  What lessons can be drawn for those transition economies that are still struggling to 
achieve macroeconomic stability and economic growth? 
 
?  Under the emerging economic system, what is the potential contribution to growth of the 
technological convergence (catching-up) factor? 
 
These specific questions are addressed in Part B of the paper1  The wider issues of reform 
strategy and the content of the main macroeconomic policies are discussed in Part A.  The 
transition countries covered in this survey are listed in Table 1.  They are divided into two 
groups:  13 Central European and Baltic countries and 12 members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS).  This division is motivated, in part, by similarities in the choice of 
reform strategies made by the countries in each group.  Table 1 also gives two GDP estimates for 
each country in 1998, one based on market exchange rates and the other based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) exchange rates.  The latter estimates are used to obtain each country’s 
weighting.  These weightings are then used in Part B of the paper to produce weighted averages 
and absolute mean deviations for the main macroeconomic variables; also weighted econometric 
estimates of the correlation coefficients between output falls and inflation rates, all for the years 
1991-1998. The PPP estimates of GDP imply that, in 1998, the combined weighting of the CIS 
                                                
1 All these questions except the last one were formulated by Paul Rayment, Director of the Economic Analysis 
Division of the UN’s Economic Commission for Europe, on behalf of the Seminar’s organisers. 
 2 
region was 3.7% of the world economy and the combined weighting of the CE and Baltic 
countries was 2.4%. 
 
 
PART A. An Overview of Reforms and Policies 
 
 
1. Reform Strategy 
 
The reform of the economic system that occurred in Central Europe and the FSU in the 1990s 
has been fundamental, involving major changes of institutions, types of ownership, corporate 
governance, laws, modes of interpersonal behaviour, and attitudes to work.  Some institutions 
were cut in size or closed down, others expanded or created.  These institutional changes were 
superimposed on massive changes in relative prices and the pattern of foreign trade; the latter 
changes caused in their turn major shifts in the composition of output.  In terms of institutions, 
skills, prices and products, there was therefore a large distance between the initial point (where a 
given post-socialist economy found itself just before the reform) and the end point of its intended 
transition.  Reform strategies have addressed the content, the sequence and the speed of reforms 
required to effect this transition. 
 In adopting a broad reform strategy and specific polices, a transition country had to take 
into account its particular economic circumstances and political constraints.  Such a strategy had 
typically six major components:  micro-liberalisation (especially with regard to prices, trade and 
entry); macro-stabilisation (especially with regard to inflation, public finances and foreign debt); 
structural changes (especially privatisation and international trade); new market institutions 
(especially with regard to commercial codes, property rights and the financial/capital markets 
sector); safety nets, and external assistance.  The first four were crucial components of any 
reform package.  Soaring unemployment and the elimination of most subsidies to households 
required a complete re-modelling of the welfare system.  With the exception of the former East 
Germany, and to some extent also Bulgaria, Poland and parts of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, 
Kosovo) external assistance was typically small and of limited impact. 
 The inherited circumstances fall into two categories, common and country-specific.  As 
the reform policies and transition paths have exhibited some basic similarities among countries, 
the common category would seem to have dominated.  Nevertheless, the variations in country-
specific circumstances were substantial enough to have a major impact on the choice of overall 
reform strategy as well as specific policies. 
 The similarities were possibly greatest with respect to micro-liberalisation and certain 
important structural changes, notably re-orientation of foreign trade and privatisation.  Somewhat 
unexpectedly, the greatest differences initially emerged in the area of macroeconomic policy.  
These differences, however, narrowed down in the second half of the 1990s. 
 Three broad reform strategies may be distinguished:  the ‘shock therapy’, rapid 
adjustment and gradual change.  The shock therapy approach was applied really only in the 
former East Germany.  Although this strategy offered the potential for a fast reallocation of 
resources, it proved far too costly in the short and medium term to be of interest to any other 
post-communist country2. At the other end of the spectrum is a gradual strategy.  This has been 
                                                
2 J. Kornai in “Ten Years After The Road to a Free Economy” (The Author’s Self-Evaluation, the World Bank’s 
Annual Conference on Development Economics, April 18-20, 2000, Washington, D.C.) suggests that, in the early 
1990s, “many participants in the post-socialist transformation suffered from an obsession with speed”, and notes that 
“excessive emphasis on speed leads to impatience, aggressiveness and arrogance”.  He uses mass-privatization 
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pursued successfully by China since the late 1970s.  However, in conditions of a total (economic, 
institutional and political) crisis, virtually the only choice open for the FSU and Central Europe 
was a form of rapid adjustment.  A strong variant of it (variant S below) was adopted by some 
countries, e.g. Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia, and a weak variant (variant W) by most other countries, particularly Russia and 
Ukraine.  The differences between the two variants have been substantial, especially during the 
first few years of transition. 
 
Variant S (most Central European and Baltic countries) 
One way of defining this variant was formulated by Vaclav Klaus, the then Prime 
Minister of the Czech Republic, in the shape of Ten Commandments3. They are as follows: 
 
(i) Reforms in post-communist countries are the outcome of a complex social and political 
process, and cannot therefore be pre-planned or socially-engineered by any one person or 
centre. 
(ii) The role of foreign aid is marginal. 
(iii) An economic shock, meaning a large fall in output, is inevitable. 
(iv) Dramatic actions are required to impose a restrictive macroeconomic policy, liberalise 
prices and foreign trade, and establish a process for privatisation. 
(v) A restrictive macroeconomic policy must be sustained. 
(vi) The price shock resulting from price liberalisation must be vigorously defended and 
survived. 
(vii) Economic restructuring requires comprehensive privatisation. 
(viii) Transformation costs must be widely shared. 
(ix) Successful transformation requires the opening of markets to foreign goods and the free 
flow of peoples and ideas. 
(x) Successful transformation requires successful politicians. 
 
These commandments well encapsulate the views of a substantial body of reformers – 
both decision-makers and their advisers, in the early 1990s.  However, actual developments 
provide the basis for significant modifications to this original formulation. 
 The choice of reforms, while certainly the outcome of a political process, has been 
limited by the overriding goal of imitating or even replicating the well-known solutions, in terms 
of both institutions and policies, of market-based capitalist economies.  Moreover, reformers can 
have, should have and usually do have specific reform blueprints for achieving this goal.  These 
blueprints have been useful even if the timetable, the sequencing and the methods of their 
implementation may have changed under the weight of political pressures. 
 With respect to foreign aid, the main reason for its marginal role for most countries has 
been the size of their economies.  Using the 1998 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, 
the combined GDP of the FSU and Central Europe was, on the eve of the reforms, some 3500 
billion US dollars (Data in Table 1 imply that it was 2300 billion US dollars in 1998).  The 
investment needed to restructure economies of that size, so as to regain the pre-reform level of 
GDP, is probably of the same order of magnitude.  The combined resources of the IMF, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
programmes in the Czech Republic and Russia as examples.  However, actual policies of many reformers were often 
much less radical than their rhetorics.  This applies also to the possibly most influential reformers of the region:  
Balcerowicz, Gaidar and Klaus. 
3 V. Klaus “The Ten Commandments of Systemic Reform”, Group of Thirty, Occasional Paper No.43, Washington 
D.C. (1993). 
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World Bank and the EBRD available to transition countries have been, by comparison, small, 
and can, in any case, be provided only on a commercial basis, and therefore subject to 
performance conditions which economies in transition cannot easily meet. Only transfers to the 
former East Germany have been really large in relation to its own GDP, and, indeed, have been 
several times larger than the total aid extended to all other transition countries.  However, the 
impact on economic recovery has been moderate.  Moreover, in the case of Russia, it was not an 
extension of external financing but its discontinuation, following the crisis of August 1998, that 
forced the domestic adjustments in policies which accelerated the reform process.  Still, there are 
a few countries, e.g. Bulgaria and Poland, in which foreign aid, especially in the form of partial 
debt cancellations, has been important and helpful. 
 Commandments Four to Seven formed the core of reform efforts.  Short-term gains (if 
any) arising from conducting a loose macroeconomic policy turned out to be small, while 
medium and long-term gains from establishing a stable macroeconomic environment are 
commonly thought to be large.  Initially, the main objective of a stabilisation policy may and 
possibly should be moderate inflation, rather than stable prices.  Only, once a country has moved 
from transformation to recovery and sustainable growth, a high quality macroeconomic stability 
becomes essential.  This requirement applies, above all, for the candidate members of the 
European Union.  A similar caveat can be made with respect to Klaus’ Seventh Commandment, 
concerning the need for rapid privatisation.  In Poland, state-driven privatisation has been slow.  
But a rapid autonomous growth of the original private sector has ensured that the total private 
sector accounted, in 1999, for about 65% of GDP.  Privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), while usually helpful, may thus not be as necessary as some reformers initially believed.  
The quality of privatisation has proved to be very important, and there is a trade-off between 
speed and quality. 
 The Tenth Commandment has also proved to overstate the case.  Successful politicians 
can be helpful, but not necessary for a successful transformation.  Reform must be legitimised 
through a democratic political process.  This is vital.  But the initial legitimisation was provided 
by the collapse of the communist system.  This collapse offered a window of opportunity, the 
Balcerowicz period of ‘extraordinary politics’, to initiate the kind of reforms which could not be 
easily reversed under more hostile political conditions which prevailed later on.  The socially 
costly phase of transition took place at a time when democratic institutions were in their early 
infancy.  Consequently there were (and in most cases, still are) typically too many small parties 
with ill-defined policies, the division of power between the main central institutions has often 
been unclear and many politicians lack experience of efficient communication with the 
electorate.  Such circumstances can produce confusion and political instability which hinder the 
process of economic reform and pose a continual threat to democratic politics.  The result has 
been frequent changes of government and, in many cases, legislation slowdowns.  However, 
such frequent changes have also provided an opportunity to employ the political capital of a 
large pool of politicians during the socially most costly phase of transformation. 
 From today’s perspective, it is also noticeable that Klaus’ formulation understates the 
importance of the task of creating a new legal and institutional environment and a new culture of 
habits and attitudes which a modern market economy requires.  This task  has been particularly 
important in the countries of the FSU. 
 The more successful transitions of the Central European and Baltics countries are 
associated with the S-variant of the rapid adjustment model.  One of the most successful 
countries has been Poland, where real GDP was, in 1999, one quarter higher than at the 
beginning of the transition in 1989 - by far the best result in the region.  After a contraction of 
about 15 percent in 1990 and 1991, the economy has grown at an average rate of 5 percent per 
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annum.  Estonia, Hungary Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia have also experienced rapid 
growth in the last few years. 
 
The Polish model of transition consisted of five main elements:4 
 
1. Complete liberalisation of de novo private sector entry into almost all areas of economic 
activity (January 1989 and January 1990); 
2. Adoption of the pre-1939 commercial code (1982) and abolition of communist party 
organisations in SOEs, which gave real power to the workers’ councils that had formally 
exercised it since 1981 (end 1989); 
3. Very rapid price liberalisation (during 1989 the share of freely determined prices rose 
from 25% to 90%); 
4. Introduction of hard budget constraints on SOEs and a sharp reduction of inflation to a 
moderate level, through fiscal, monetary and wages polices (January 1990), followed by 
gradual dis-inflation; 
5. Current account convertibility of the currency and almost complete foreign trade 
liberalisation (January 1990). 
 
The Polish programme was gradual in many important respects:  it took 10 years to 
reduce inflation to below 1% a month, mass privatisation was limited mainly to small 
enterprises, social transfers have been large (pensions increased substantially in relation to 
wages) and budget deficits remained significant throughout the 1990s. The results of the 
programme were, on the positive side:  the fast introduction of market prices based on relative 
scarcity and world prices for traded goods; a financial squeeze on SOEs, which forced them to 
release rapidly excess labour and physical capital (this is known as asset privatisation);  the 
maintenance of a minimum tolerable level of effective corporate governance in SOEs (due in 
part to the workers’ councils); and very rapid development of the de novo private sector. On the 
negative side, the restructuring of public services and public finances has been inadequate, 
limiting the growth of domestic savings and investments. 
The Hungarian model has been similar.  The same five main elements of reform were 
introduced as enacted and implemented in Poland, although their implementation was somewhat 
more gradual and workers councils had little importance.  However, the bankruptcy law that was 
enacted and implemented has been possibly the most radical in Central Europe.  Also the growth 
of the domestic de novo private sector tended to be in services rather than in manufacturing, 
where there was a fairly rapid development due to foreign direct investment (FDI).  A larger 
external debt burden and poorer macroeconomic policies meant that stabilisation of the GDP 
contraction took longer than in Poland and – which was more significant - the beginning of rapid 
growth was delayed by five years (until 1997). 
Slovenia was also somewhat of an exception, on two counts:  earlier, pre-transition 
reforms had been more substantial than elsewhere in Central Europe and the initial crisis was 
much more limited.  Hence a more gradual transformation was feasible and, indeed, adopted in 
the early 1990s.  
                                                
4 This description of the programme and the model follows that given by M. Dabrowski, S. Gomulka and J. 
Rostowski, in “Whence Reform? A Critique of the Stiglitz Perspective”, Centre for Economic Performance 
Discussion Paper No.471, London School of Economics and the Central European University, mimeo, 2000.  More 
details of the model may be found in S. Gomulka (1998), “The Polish Model of Transformation and Growth”, 
Economics of Transition, vol.6(1); pp.163-171, and in M. Dabrowski (1999), “Ten Years of the Polish Economic 
Transition 1989-1999”, paper presented at the 5th Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economies:  Ten Years of 
Transition: What Have we Learned and What Lies Ahead, June 23-25 Dubrovnik. 
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Following the adoption of such programmes, the experience of successful transitions 
indicate that growth can resume quickly and can proceed at a rapid pace.  This growth has been 
driven almost entirely by de novo private sector development, rather than through the 
restructuring of SOEs, privatised or otherwise5. De novo private activity, which at first was 
predominantly domestic and concentrated in services, as time went on, in all successful countries 
came to involve significant foreign FDI and to expand into manufacturing industry. 
The experience of the Central European and Baltic countries demonstrates:  the 
usefulness of pre-existing rules and institutions (workers’ councils, a commercial code, a legal 
system); the importance of macro-economic stabilisation and the accompanying imposition of 
hard budget constraints; and the importance of the liberalisation of prices, trade and entry (PTE) 
- for growth of new private enterprise. 
 
Variant W (most CIS countries) 
In Russia, the 1992 attempt at sharp budget hardening/disinflation cum full PTE 
liberalisation, the Gaidar plan failed.  This meant that enterprises have, subsequently, been under 
less pressure to divest physical assets and shed labour they did not need, thus effectively denying 
de novo private firms the resources they need for their development.  The failure to liberalise 
thoroughly kept the set-up costs for new firms high.  For several years large subsidised credits 
and entry barriers undermined the credibility of the strategy, inducing capital flight, creating 
opportunities for tax avoidance and criminal asset stripping, as well as slowing down the 
restructuring by old firms. The Russian reform was nevertheless radical, since by and large 
prices and wages were liberalised quickly.  As a result, markets started to develop, taking over 
from the planners the informational and co-ordination roles.  A large-scale privatisation 
programme was also initiated early on and implemented quickly.  This embarking on 
privatisation before full liberalisation (involving not just product prices, exchange rates and 
interest rates but also trade and entry terms), and before the hardening of budget constraints for 
enterprises and disinflation was the key characteristic feature of the reform strategy adopted by 
Russia and most other CIS countries in the first few years of transition.  However, these 
differences between variants S and W have narrowed down in the late 1990s. 
 
 
2. Has the Output Collapse Been Inevitable? 
 
The phenomenon of large falls in output in the economies of CE and FSU during their systemic 
transformation in the 1990s is one of the most researched - yet one of the most controversial.  
Kornai proposed the term ‘transformational recession’ to indicate that these falls were directly 
related to the change of economic system rather than to transition policies.  However, these falls 
occurred against a background of rapid growth in China and Vietnam, which had also been 
introducing fundamental changes in their economic systems.  This may indicate that the falls 
were related not merely to the systemic transformation as such, but also to its speed.  Stiglitz, 
among others, argues that the speed of transition was a choice variable, and that choosing high 
speed was a major error6. In a recent survey of evidence and interpretations of the recession, the 
                                                
5 J. Rostowski (1993), “Private Sector Development, Structural Changes and Macroeconomic Stabilisation:  The 
Case of Poland 1998-93”, Centre for Economic Performance, DP No.159, London School of Economics; and 
S. Gomulka (1998), “The Polish Model of Transformation and Growth”, Economics of Transition, vol.6(1): 
pp.163-171. 
6 J. Stiglitz (1999), “Whither Reform”, Annual Bank Conference in Development Economics, World Bank, 
Washington D.C., and “Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodies?” Annual Bank Conference on Development 
Economics_Europe, World Bank (1999), Paris. 
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present author suggested that, unlike in China and Vietnam, in the countries of CE and the FSU 
(and Mongolia) the rapid speed was forced principally by the initial conditions of their deep and 
all-embracing (economic, institutional and political) crisis7.  In the survey, I identified four 
classes of specific causes of output falls:  (1) massive and rapid changes in relative prices in 
conditions of limited resource mobility; (2) the elimination of excessive real aggregate demand 
to establish buyers’ markets; (3) the collapse of captive markets within the former CMEA area; 
and (4) the collapse of the arms industry and of state-financed investments in housing, energy, 
agriculture, and the infrastructure.  Relative prices changed mainly as a result of rapid price and 
trade liberalisations, sharp increases in interest rates, large up-front devaluations, and 
considerable harmonisations in turnover and border tax rates. 
 A sharp price liberalisation caused large supply-side and demand-side shocks that 
reduced outputs and increased prices.  However, the high speed of price liberalisation was in part 
a consequence of the collapse of central planning institutions, since this collapse created the need 
to establish immediately a market-based co-ordination mechanism, of which market-clearing 
(free) prices were an essential part.  A fairly rapid PTE liberalisation was also needed to enhance 
competition and begin structural changes. 
 In the initial period of transition, economic developments in the FSU and CE reflected 
not so much the quality of current reforms, but the pre-reform crisis conditions, which had led to 
the collapse of the Soviet style economic, military and political system.  In Russia, because of 
this crisis, industrial output had started to fall sharply - already in 1991; still under the old 
system.  Whether reform had taken place or not, this fall would have presumably continued as 
the system unwound, as the experience of slow and/or late reformers would indicate, e.g. 
Bulgaria, Romania and Belarus.  For the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (and the associated 
contraction of the defence industry), of the CMEA (and the associated contraction of trade) and 
of the USSR itself (and the associated disruption of intra-Soviet production links), have all been 
the largely inevitable consequences of earlier events, in Russia and elsewhere.  The reduction in 
the output of the defence and defence-related industries alone, according to one knowledgeable 
source, accounts for 60% of the fall in industrial production in Russia8. 
 In his forceful challenge of the merits of fast liberalisation and stabilisation, Stiglitz 
accepts that, according to economic theory, reducing price distortions through price and trade 
liberalisation and price stabilisation, should in addition to improving incentives through 
privatisation, “have moved countries closer to their production possibilities curve”9. The problem 
for him is that “output should have soared – instead it plummeted”.  Much of his challenge to the 
conventional theory is motivated by this apparent contradiction.  However, Stiglitz ignores the 
arguments which associate output falls in the initial phase of transition mainly with unusually 
large inherited (structural and price) distortions and with the institutional crises which forced the 
tempo of price liberalisation.  Despite wide differences in reform policies, the cumulative falls in 
industrial output, at 40-60%, were not just large but also similar between countries.  He also 
ignores the fact that, as Aaslund, Boone and Johnson first showed10, the speed of macroeconomic 
stabilisation had a significant effect on the time profile of decline, but had little impact upon the 
magnitude of the cumulative fall of output.  These falls tended to be larger in the countries which 
were slow in bringing inflation to moderate levels, say below 40% per annum.  The evidence is 
too weak to suggest the presence of causality from higher inflation to larger cumulative output 
                                                
7 S. Gomulka (1998), “Output:  Causes of the Decline and the Recovery”, in Emerging from Communism: Lessons 
from Russia, China and Eastern Europe, eds. P. Boone, S. Gomulka and R. Layard,  MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
8 Y. Yassin (1999), “Defeat or Retreat? Russia’s Reforms and the Financial Crisis”, mimeo. Moscow. 
9 References in footnote 4. 
10 A. Aaslund, P. Boone and S. Johnson (1996), “How to Stabilize:  Lessons from Post-Communist Countries”, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 81(1) 217-315. 
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falls.  It is probably more likely that the countries (mainly within the FSU) which were subjected 
to larger supply-side and demand-side shocks also experienced larger output falls and, 
simultaneously, higher inflation (I shall return to this point in Part B, Section 5).  Nevertheless, 
apart from increasing inflation, the main effect of a loose macroeconomic policy would appear to 
have been, in most cases, to reduce the rate of fall and, therefore, to extend the length of the 
transformational recession11.  However, as the EBRD’s Transition Reports 1995-1999 note, the 
evidence goes to support the proposition that, in the countries which liberalised and stabilised to 
a greater extent, output not only stopped falling earlier, but also started to recover faster (I shall 
return to this point in Part B, Section 2). 
The medium-term purpose of the reforms is to restructure transition economies in favour 
of activities producing more value added per unit of primary inputs (of labour and capital).  If 
restructuring needs had been small, real wages highly flexible and labour and capital resources 
easily moveable, then large output falls would have been unnecessary to effect such a 
restructuring.  However, restructuring needs were, in fact, exceptionally large and the mobility of 
resources was quite limited.  In such circumstances unemployment, although it does involve 
short term costs, performs a positive signalling role, by making it clear to people that they have 
to either change skills and move to higher productivity work or accept lower real incomes.  
Therefore, the welfare cost associated with a temporary rise in unemployment can be thought of 
as a form of investment needed to achieve a permanent welfare gain from a better allocation of 
labour and other resources. 
 
 
3. Money Has Been the Key Nominal Anchor 
 
In most countries of Central and Eastern Europe it was assumed that stabilisation of the 
liberalised prices must be based on the standard International Monetary Fund (IMF) approach, 
with an important role of nominal anchors assigned to an incomes policy and – when feasible - a 
fixed exchange rate, in addition to restrictive fiscal and monetary policies.  In the event, 
however, the supply of credit to governments and enterprises proved by far the dominant 
nominal anchor, with the exchange rate and the incomes policy playing only supportive roles. 
Two related broad conclusions can be drawn from the evidence regarding dis-inflation 
experiences in transition countries.  One is that fiscal fundamentals, that is, the size of the budget 
deficit of general government and the way it is financed, have been the key to dis-inflation.  The 
other is that the policy of a fixed nominal exchange rate was helpful but not essential, and that, in 
any case, its survival was strictly conditional on a sound fiscal policy12. Also, “the transition 
record suggests that innovative exchange rate arrangements can provide only a brief interval 
during which sound fiscal discipline needs to be put in place for controlling inflation”13. With 
respect to the exchange rate, low levels of international reserves and poor credibility of 
macroeconomic policies just before the start of transition, forced large up-front devaluations in 
all countries except Hungary.  The result was that, initially, world prices offered little discipline 
for domestic prices.  A restrictive incomes policy was intended to achieve a targeted inflation 
rate with less restrictive other policies and, hence, a somewhat smaller recession.  However, 
                                                
11 On this point, see also EBRD’s Transition Report (1999), p.64. 
12 D. Begg, “Disinflation in Central and Eastern Europe”, and S. Gomulka, “Comment on Begg”, both in Moderate 
Inflation: The Experience of Transition Economies  (1998), IMF and National Bank of Hungary, C. Cottarelli and G. 
Szepary (eds.), Washington , D.C. 
13 P. Desai, “Macroeconomic Fragility and Exchange Rate Vulnerability:  A Cautionary Record of Transition 
Economies”, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.26(4):  pp.621-641 (1998). 
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given the large changes and uncertainties, it has proved difficult to co-ordinate incomes policy 
with main (fiscal and monetary) macroeconomic policies.  In Poland in 1990 and Czecho-
Slovakia in 1991, for instance, those main policies were initially so restrictive that in most 
enterprises incomes policies were not binding.  In the FSU the authorities took the view that a 
restrictive incomes policy could not be implemented for political reasons.  In the CIS countries 
the politically dependent central banks became initially, in their credit policy for enterprises, 
concerned above all with the level of economic activity, typically the chief domain of 
governments.  As noted earlier, in the first few years of transition, the CIS governments 
themselves ran large budget deficits which were monetized (Table 3).  The consequence was 
wage-price inflationary spirals and (near) hyperinflations.  
In the initial years some central banks made successful use of the instrument of credit 
limits.  Deploying this instrument means that real interest rates need not be high - though they 
should not have been as negative as they were in most of the FSU.  These rates may have to be 
higher in the intermediate stage of transition when credit limits are lifted and the real exchange 
rate has had the time to appreciate.  During that stage high interest rates became the key policy 
instrument for protecting bank savings and restraining wage inflation.  However, in the advanced 
stage of transition, higher credibility and capital account liberalisations have resulted in 
increased international capital mobility.  This in turn forces some convergence of high domestic 
interest rates to low world interest rates. 
 
 
4. The Exchange Rate Policy  
 
The freedom to set the exchange rate policy was initially highly constrained by low levels of 
international reserves and an urgent need to win credibility to the new policy of full current 
account convertibility at a uniform rate.  It was desirable to have a regime of a fixed nominal 
exchange rate in order for the rate to serve as an anchor for domestic prices, thus reducing 
inflationary expectations and inflation itself.  However, the countries which adopted such a 
regime had to devalue up-front strongly to ensure a sufficiently competitive rate, so that reserves 
would increase.  As I have already noted, such devaluations opened up large gaps between 
domestic and foreign prices, thereby undermining the anchoring role of the exchange rate.  In 
Russia (and many other CIS countries) international reserves were too low and the monetary and 
fiscal policies too lax to contemplate nominal exchange rate pegging.  A floating exchange rate 
regime was therefore adopted.  However, the need to build up reserves meant that Russia and 
other floaters could not adopt a pure float.  Once the reserves become large as a result of 
interventions in the exchange market, the case for a pure float is stronger.  A broad generalisation 
would be that, at the (early) stabilisation stage of transition, a concern with dis-inflation favoured 
nominal exchange rate pegging while at the (later) advanced stage when inflation is already low, 
the need to limit the destabilising effects of capital inflows favoured a more flexible exchange 
rate regime, including pure float as an extreme option. Between these two stages, both the 
inflation rate and reserves would be of moderate sizes, and the concern to remain competitive 
favoured the adoption of a regime for the exchange rate determination that would combine some 
flexibility in nominal terms with some stability in real terms.  The regime chosen for this 
intermediate stage was typically a crawling band, with the pre-announced rate of crawl linked to 
anticipated inflation.  This rate would therefore decline as dis-inflation progressed, while the 
band would be narrow initially and widen over time to a maximum of the ERM-2 size of ±15%.  
To limit the domestic cost of any external shock, it was also desirable to peg to a basket of 
currencies, with a composition reflecting trade flows, rather than to any single currency.  
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Exchange rate movements in all transition economies, with the notable exception of 
Hungary, have followed a similar path, with a sharp depreciation at the start of transition 
followed by gradual real appreciation.  Such a path is hardly surprising given the initial 
conditions: low levels of international reserves, large risks associated with transition, 
inexperienced policy makers, no record of convertibility, and typically poor credibility of 
policies14.  
Several countries adopted the institution of a currency board, under which nominal 
pegging is combined with full backing of the base money by international reserves.   The key 
benefit of such an arrangement is a sizeable instant gain in credibility.  This immediately lowers 
inflationary expectations, which in turn reduce market interest rates, both nominal and real.  As 
the experience of Baltic countries in early 1990s and Bulgaria in 1997 showed, falls in interest 
rates could be large and rapid.  In the short term, lower interest rates reduce the cost of servicing 
debt, both private and public, which in turn reduces both the stock of under-performing assets of 
the banking sector and the budget deficit of the government, thus further improving credibility.  
A currency board also helps to instil confidence among investors and hence supports recovery of 
the enterprise sector.  
However, the strait-jacket of the currency board deprives the macroeconomic framework 
of any flexibility with respect to the exchange rate. This, and indeed, any fixed nominal 
exchange rate regime may mislead the private sector into believing that the exchange rate risk is 
completely absent.  The result is an in-built tendency to contract a large foreign debt, which was 
the case not only in South-East Asia but also in the Czech Republic.  This tendency is 
particularly strong in countries with weak financial institutions, to which category most 
transition countries still belong15. Such a debt, whether public or private, in turn produces a risk 
of a currency attack, which, if successful, leads to sharp devaluation and stagflation. 
 
 
PART B. A Detailed Discussion of Specific Issues 
 
 
1. The Macroeconomic Framework:  What Progress?  
 
To be conducive to investment and growth, the macroeconomic environment has to meet several 
criteria.  I shall first articulate these criteria and then use them for an evaluation of the progress 
which the 25 transition countries have made during the 1990s. 
The criteria which, I suggest, would be desirable to meet are as follows: 
                                                
14 Economic and other factors which underlie exchange rate movements in transition economies are discussed by 
L.Halpern and C. Wyplosz (1997), “Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates in Transition Economies”, IMF Staff Papers , 
44(4):  pp.430-460 and by the Symposium on Exchange Rates, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.26(4), 
December 1998.   The main reason for the Hungary’s exception was, probably, the country’s high standing among 
foreign investors at the start of transition. Specific issues with respect to the exchange rate policy of the transition 
countries which are the candidate members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) are discussed, among others, 
by G. Kopits, in “Implications of EMU for Exchange Rate :Policy in Central and Eastern Europe”, IMF WP, 
January 1999. 
15 S. Fries, M. Raiser and N. Stern, in “Stress Test for Reforms:  Transition and East Asia ‘Contagion’”, Economics 
of Transition, vol.7(2); pp.535-567, find that more vulnerable to contagion have been the transition countries with 
large public or private sector imbalances and low reserve cover of short-term debt and that these weak fundamentals  
have their origin in inadequate structural and institutional reforms. A good comparative discussion of risk indicators 
for the banking sector in six transition Central European countries is provided by S. Kawalec, “Banking Sector 
Systemic Risk in Selected European Countries”, CASE Report No. 23, Warsaw (1999). 
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(i) The inflation rate to be in the moderate range of 10-40%, with a good prospect of it 
falling below 10% and remaining in the 0-10% range. 
(ii) The general government (GG) budget deficit to be reduced from the initial 5-30% of 
GDP for most countries to a level below 3% of GDP, with a high premium given to a 
policy of a budget surplus. 
(iii) The public debt to be stable at a level significantly below 60% of GDP.  
(iv) The GG expenditure to be reduced from its pre- transition level of some 50% to 60% of 
GDP to a level in the range of 30% to 40% of GDP. 
(v) Official reserves of international exchange to equal at least 4 months of imports of goods 
and services, exceed total (public and private) short-term foreign debt, and be equal to at 
least 1/3 of public foreign debt. 
(vi) Direct taxes (especially profit taxes) to be low, together with social insurance 
contributions providing revenues of less than, say, 20% of GDP. 
(vii) The monetization of the economy to be substantial, equal at least to 30% of GDP. 
(viii) The lending rate to be below 20% in nominal terms and below 10% in real terms. 
 
The first three criteria are of the Maastricht category.  They are not independent.  If D is 
public debt, Y is GDP, P is the price level and D is the budget deficit, the fiscal sustainability 
requires that the ratio D/PY be constant, which implies that: 
 
 
where p is the rate of inflation and g is the growth rate of GDP.  The LHS of (1) is the budget 
deficit as a proportion of GDP, and D/PY on the RHS is the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio.  For 
most of the EU member countries, the rate g is expected to be low, say 3%.  The maximum 
budget deficit of 3% is thus consistent with the maximum debt of 60% only if the inflation rate is 
maintained, in this case, at 2%.  Transition economies are expected to grow at a rate 
(significantly) higher than 3%.  Those countries which intend to join the EMU will need to meet 
the Maastricht criteria on inflation and the budget deficit, hence equation (1) implies that they 
would have to keep public debt at a level (significantly) lower than 60% of their GDP16. Criteria 
(ii), (iv) and (vi) are also related.  Their common motivation is to increase national savings and 
improve incentives for work and investment.  Criterion (v) is intended to reduce the exchange 
rate risk and criterion (vii) serves to indicate that the banking sector has developed sufficiently to 
intermediate effectively between savers (mainly households) and investors (mainly enterprises). 
The differences between the two groups of countries can be noted.  Compared to the CE and 
Baltic countries, in the CIS countries both inflation and budget deficits have been much higher, 
but public expenditures have declined more sharply.  Gross reserves have increased to adequate 
levels in the CE countries, but still remain very low in the CIS region.  The ratios of broad 
money to nominal GDP have been remarkably stable, at moderately high levels, in the CE and 
Baltic countries, but declined sharply, as one would except, during the high inflation period in 
the CIS region, where they now stand at very low levels.  Despite these significant differences, a 
considerable convergence has taken place in macroeconomic conditions between and within the 
two groups, together with a sharp improvement over time in both. 
                                                
16 Fiscal sustainability in transition economies has been discussed recently by several authors, e.g. W.H. Buiter 
(1997), “Aspects of Fiscal Policy in Some Transition Economies under Fund-Supported Programs”, IMF WP No.31, 
April. 
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 In terms of our eight macroeconomic criteria, the CE and Baltic countries are close to 
meeting the criteria with respect to variables 2 to 7 in Table 2.  The data on public debt and taxes 
also indicate compliance with the criteria for these two additional indicators.  For the CIS region, 
the macroeconomic balance is still fragile, and the macroeconomic environment, while no longer 
hostile to growth as it was in the early 1990s, needs to be significantly improved to become 
growth-friendly.  The financial crisis of August 1998 revealed the extent of Russia’s 
macroeconomic imbalance.  However, following this crisis, policy adjustments in Russia and 
elsewhere in the CIS group have contained its destabilising effects, restored equilibrium and, 
consequently, reduced further the performance gap between this group and the CE and Baltic 
countries. 
 
 
2. What Distinguishes the More Successful From the Less Successful 
Countries? 
 
I propose to measure the success of reforms in the transition countries by their ability to recreate 
the (institutional, legal and economic) conditions for rapid and sustainable growth.  This ability 
is indicated by the increase in output since the start of recovery.  It is this yardstick which 
differentiates strongly the Baltic countries from, for example, Russia and Ukraine within the 
FSU, and much of Central Europe from much of the FSU.  It is natural to ask about the factors 
underlying these differences:  are they initial conditions, the state of institutions or the political 
environment? 
 The cumulative output changes between 1989 and 1998, and between the lowest level 
and year 1998, are shown in Table 4, in which the countries are also graded according to their 
commitment to liberalisation and stabilisation.  Several countries achieved significant recoveries 
in GDP growth, but some of these recoveries are not reform-related.  A near civil war led to a 
recession over-shooting in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.  Subsequent 
improvements in political stability would have contributed much to the recovery of those 
countries’ economies.  There are also two countries, Bielarus and the Kyrgyz Republic, where 
substantial recoveries may have been artificial, as they reflect in part the postponement of the 
needed structural changes17. 
 There is a substantial volume of empirical studies attempting to provide explanations of 
the wide variation in the rate and length of recovery.  These studies fall into two broad groups, 
one based on macroeconomic data and the other on enterprise data.  One of the latest 
comprehensive studies in the first group, using a general-to-specific modelling approach, finds 
some evidence in support of  “the pre-eminence of structural reforms over both initial conditions 
and macroeconomic variables in explaining cross-country differences in performance and the 
timing of the recovery”18. In particular, more liberalised economies grow faster.  However, as the 
periods of recovery have been short for most countries, econometric results are not yet stable.  
The wide differences in performance within countries suggest that initial conditions might be 
more potent than indicated by aggregate data. Indeed, another recent empirical study, using a 
somewhat different statistical method, finds that growth performance during the 1990s was 
                                                
17 According to the Bielarus Minister of Economy, economic growth “during the second half of the 1990s was 
substantially initiated by additional loading of old manufacturing facilities and was boosted…by emission credits 
[which] allowed Bielarus to preserve her manufacturing potentials and to solve some important social problems”, V. 
Shimov, Report presented at the UN/ECE Spring Seminar, May 2, 2000, Geneva. 
18 A. Berg, E. Borensztein, R. Sahay, and J. Zettelmyer, “The Evolution of Output in Transition Economies: 
Explaining the Differences”, WP, IMF (1999). 
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“substantially determined by initial conditions, both directly and indirectly through their impact 
on structural reforms”19. 
 The periods of positive growth have been short for most countries, but especially for the 
three main CIS countries - Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and for Bulgaria and Romania in 
Central Europe.  These five countries (together with Moldova) are clearly the least successful of 
all the twenty-five transition countries in our table.  Recovery in both the Czech Republic (1997-
1999) and Hungary (1995-1996) have suffered unexpectedly from macroeconomic instabilities.  
The long pause in recovery in the Czech Republic has prompted a reappraisal of the virtues of 
rapid voucher-type privatisation.  It is this negative experience of the Czech Republic and a 
much better growth performance of Poland, Estonia and, recently, also Hungary which led to the 
new wisdom, namely that the success of transition depends above all on a rapid creation of 
conditions – institutional, legal, microeconomic and macroeconomic – which are conducive to 
the development and growth of a new private sector (including FDI).  From this current 
perspective, it is clear that with the exception of some authors, notably Kornai20, the early 
conventional view overestimated the positive impact on performance of a fast privatization of 
SOEs and, by the same token, failed to appreciate strongly enough the key role that a completely 
new private sector would play in the recovery and growth. 
 Given the central role of the new private sector in recovery and post-transition growth, it 
is worth noting the presence of wide international differences in the domestic/foreign 
composition of that sector, with Poland and Hungary being the extreme cases and Estonia 
somewhere in between.  In all these three countries, strong liberalisation policies with respect to 
prices, trade and entry were adopted early, and in conjunction with a policy of harder budget 
constraints and increased competition pressures for SOEs.  Poland was also helped by the 
presence of a sizeable private sector outside agriculture at the beginning of transition. 
 
 
3. How Far Have Weak or Missing Institutions Hampered Effectual 
Policy-Making? 
 
In the first decade of the transformation, the institutional deficiency was severe, and this added 
an additional dimension of difficulty to policy-making.  Macroeconomic management was 
particularly difficult in the new countries of the FSU, which initially lacked their own currencies 
and central banks and where international reserves were almost non-existent. With the exception 
of Hungary and Slovenia, the introduction of personal taxes and the replacement of turnover 
taxes by a proper VAT could not take place at the start of the transition.  The capital market was 
initially almost non-existent and its development has been slow.  The result of these two types of 
deficiencies was that budget deficits were larger and their financing was to a greater extent done 
by outright monetization than would otherwise have been the case.  Large or hyper-inflations 
wiped out most bank savings in all but few transition countries, thus limiting the role of the 
banking sector in economic restructuring.  Politically independent bank supervision did not exist 
under the old system, and its necessarily gradual establishment during transition meant that in 
many countries it was too weak to prevent bank failures.  High inflation and poor banking 
practice must have been major factors underlying low bank savings, the flight from domestic 
money, and the use of parallel currencies (especially US dollars and German marks). 
                                                
19 E. Falcetti, M. Raiser and P. Sanfey, “Defying the Odds:  Initial Conditions, Reforms and Growth in the First 
Decade of Transition”, mimeo, London School of Economics and EBRD, May 2000. 
20 J. Kornai (1990), The Road to a Free Economy , Norton & Co. New York and London. 
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 Given these extreme initial circumstances, it is remarkable that it took the new countries 
of the FSU only some 4-5 years for them to establish the basic institutional framework needed to 
conduct a reasonable macroeconomic policy - by creating central banks, new currencies, bank 
supervision, international payments systems, new taxes and tax collection systems, stock 
exchanges, securities commissions, labour exchanges, and new social benefits systems.  The 
result has been a vast improvement in the macroeconomic environment of those countries in the 
second half of the 1990s.  Nevertheless, the new central institutions still lack high quality 
personnel, and they have yet to establish a tradition of trust and behaviour based on transparent 
and stable rules, consistent with long-term public interest and market principles. 
The ultimate success of transition will depend on the establishment of appropriate market 
institutions supporting macroeconomic stability, entrepreneurship and competition.  Such 
institutional changes are inherently slow and depend on the political commitment to reform of 
governments and parliaments, and on their practical effectiveness in implementing reforms and 
policies.  This commitment was clearly stronger and its effectiveness probably greater in Central 
Europe and the Baltic countries than in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  This 
difference reflects not only the longer and stricter socialist central planning in the CIS, but also a 
much stronger influence of the European Union in Central Europe and the Baltic countries, 
including (in contrast to the CIS) the embracement of the strategic aim of European Union 
membership. 
 
 
4. Have Policy Dilemmas Been Intensified By Weak Institutions? 
 
In several instances, weak institutions led to a renewal of macroeconomic instability or to a 
serious threat of such an instability.  A clear case was Albania in 1996, when rapid growth of a 
pyramid system led to a general crisis of confidence and almost to civil war.  Another, and more 
important, example was the case of Bulgaria in 1997, when poor banking supervision led to a 
sharp growth of under-performing assets.  This in turn forced interest rates to such high levels 
that the cost of servicing Bulgaria’s public debt became unsustainable.  There were two policy 
options for Bulgaria (and the IMF).  One was to inflate away this debt by a non-equivalent 
currency change or by printing a great deal of money, and then introduce a stabilisation 
programme.  The other was, effectively, to abolish the central bank and introduce in its place a 
currency board.  Such an institutional reform meant replacing domestic monetary control by 
nominal exchange rate targeting and depriving the government of the monetization option for 
financing its budget deficit.  The currency board option was, in fact, adopted on the assumption 
that the gain in credibility would be large enough to bring about sharp falls in both inflation and 
interest rates.  This assumption was later vindicated by actual developments.  Currency boards 
had been adopted earlier by the Baltic countries for similar reasons.  However, the most 
spectacular institutional failure was in Russia.  There, poor co-operation between the executive 
and the legislative branches of government, the weakness of the tax administration and lax 
expenditure controls led to an excessive short term foreign borrowing in 1997-1998, and resulted 
in a financial crisis in August 1998.  In Poland, during the early stage of transition the central 
bank operated a system of credit limits for commercial banks.  This practice was discontinued 
only with the development of an inter-bank money market.  The performance of transition 
economies and, indirectly, the conduct of macroeconomic policies, were also influenced by weak 
corporate governance and uncertainties with respect to enforcement of contracts, including those 
concerning property rights.  These factors have probably contributed to the phenomenon of 
capital flight from Russia and may account for the limited foreign direct investment to most 
 15 
countries of the CIS region.  The recent prolonged depression in the Czech Republic (1997-
1999) is also difficult to explain without reference to the quality of the corporate governance of 
the country’s enterprises, following its coupon privatisation programme.  Finally, banking 
supervision may have been inadequate to prevent the growth of under-performing loans in many 
countries, including the Czech Republic and Romania. This in its turn required repeated and 
expensive re-capitalisations of state-owned banks by governments. 
 
 
5. Has Too Much Emphasis Been Placed on Lowering Inflation – or 
Reducing it Too Rapidly – At the Expense of Economic Growth? 
 
As I discussed elsewhere, the first IMF-supported programmes for Poland and Russia placed 
much emphasis on a swift disinflation21. But these programmes tended also to underestimate the 
severity of the supply-and-demand shocks associated with the institutional crisis and price 
liberalisation, and did not sufficiently appreciate the fact that such shocks would at the same time 
sharply reduce output and be highly inflationary.  For the years 1992-1998 and for all the 25 
transition countries listed in Table 4, there are fairly strong associations between output falls and 
inflation rates. These are as follows (t-ratios in parantheses): 
 
     (3.6)  (-4.6)                     (-7.9)    (2) 
        
N = 175,    R2 =0.61,    i=1,  2…..,25    
          
                             (5.3)  (-2.2)         (-9.2)    (3) 
 
N=200,      R2  =0.53,    i = 1, 2……25 
 
 In these two equations, gY,t  is the percentage change of GDP in year t and pt  is the 
percentage inflation rate, divided by 100, in year t.  N is the number of observations and i the 
number of the country.  For the purpose of estimation, both gYi and pi have been weighted by the 
square root of the country’s i share in total GDP, expressed in terms of PPP dollars22. These 
estimates indicate that last-year inflation reduces current growth and last-year fall of output 
increases current inflation.  However, the tightest association is between current output falls and 
current inflation.  This evidence supports the view of the transformational recession as being 
essentially of the stagflation type, whereby both output falls and inflation have to some extent 
common causes.   
The policy mix required to achieve dis-inflation under such circumstances is one of a 
tight fiscal policy combined with an accommodating monetary policy.  The dis-inflation process 
                                                
21 S. Gomulka (1995), “The IMF-Supported Programs of Poland and Russia, 1990-1994:  Principles, Errors and 
Results”, Journal of Competitive Economics , vol.20(3):  316-346. 
22 For a linear system of the form:  y j = ?  a ixij + ej, the standard OLS estimates of the parameters a1, a2…an minimise  
? (y j - ? a ixij)
2.  Weighted OLS estimates minimise   ?  w j(y j - ? a ixij )
2 or ? (wj
½yj-?  a i wj
½xij)
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is equivalent to estimating a system in which original variables are re-scaled by square roots of the respective 
weightings. 
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may also have to be gradual to accommodate more easily large changes in relative prices.  In 
practice, dis-inflation was swift only in Croatia.  In the Central European and Baltic countries – 
with the exception of Romania in 1993 and 1997 and Bulgaria in 1997, which experienced strong 
inflation reversals – the dis-inflation process has been more or less gradual.  However, most CIS 
countries failed to keep their budget deficits under control and, consequently, experienced 
periods of very high inflation, even hyper-inflation.  As I already noted in Part A, in those 
countries the recession has been prolonged and the recovery either has been modest or has not 
yet materialised.  Thus, in practice, the clear failure of macroeconomic policy was limited mainly 
to the CIS countries in the years 1992-1994.  (In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan this continued also 
in 1995.) 
 At the advanced stage of transition, the rate of dis-inflation is constrained by international 
capital mobility, which limits the freedom of central banks to set and maintain interest rates 
much above the world level.  The attendant dilemmas are well-known.  If the exchange rate is 
fixed, a restrictive monetary policy induces capital inflows, as borrowers substitute domestic 
debt by foreign debt and foreign investors buy domestic assets.  The sterilisation of such inflows 
is possible, but expensive and therefore has its limits.  If the exchange rate is floating, capital 
inflows induce an appreciation of the domestic currency.  This helps to reduce inflation in the 
short-term, but may also lead to a large current account deficit and, therefore, increases the risk 
of sudden devaluation and higher inflation in the medium-term.  Borrowers in transition 
economies have little experience in estimating the exchange rate risk.  Misjudgements are 
especially likely during expectations-forming, prolonged periods of real effective appreciation.  
The appreciation trend is a feature of transition.  This trend is sustained by several factors, the 
two crucial ones being:  depressed exchange rates at the starting point and rapid improvements in 
productivity and rates of return during transition.  Productivity improvements are particularly 
rapid in countries whose reforms have been successful.  Such countries are also credible 
candidates for membership of the European Union and, for that reason attract more FDI than 
others, giving the appreciation trend a further support.  Such circumstances call for an interest 
rate policy that is not very restrictive, and place an even bigger burden on governments to 
conduct a restrictive fiscal policy.  However, if such a fiscal policy is not adopted, then any 
attempt to dis-inflate quickly nevertheless, by means of highly restrictive monetary and exchange 
rate policies, may easily backfire, as it would cause a large current account deficit which may at 
some point trigger a crisis of confidence and result in stagflation.  A short-term gain in the rate of 
dis-inflation is then obtained at the cost of a higher risk of macroeconomic instability.  During 
the run-up period to EU membership, a short-term foreign debt tends to increase rapidly.   It is 
therefore a prudent precaution, during this period, to keep international reserves high and 
increasing, even if this concern about stability causes a certain slowing down of the rate of dis-
inflation23. 
 
 
6. What Lessons Can Be Drawn for Those Transition Economies Still 
Struggling to Achieve Macroeconomic Stability and Economic Growth? 
 
The lessons which I propose to draw from these ten years of transition are as follows: 
 
                                                
23 These issues are discussed comprehensively by several authors in the book edited by Z. Drabek and S. Griffith-
Jones, Managing Capital Flows in Turbulent Times:  The Experience of Europe’s Emerging Economies in Global 
Perspective. Armonk, NY:  M.E.Sharpe (1999. 
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(i) Most former SOEs, especially those of large size, have suffered from the British 
Leyland/Rover syndrome:  the accumulation of structural problems of such magnitude 
that they are not amenable to significant ‘strategic’ restructuring and not capable of rapid 
growth whatever their new ownership and regulatory framework. Given the financial, 
managerial and other constraints, and poor positive incentives, such enterprises – unless 
taken over by large foreign investors - are capable mainly and merely of ‘defensive’ 
restructuring. 
(ii) The success of transition depends above all on the rapid creation of conditions - 
institutional, legal, microeconomic and macroeconomic – which are conducive to the 
development and growth of a new private sector, domestic and/or foreign. 
(iii) This new sector development is facilitated by increased competition through price 
liberalisation, by permitting SOEs to sell capital assets, by imposing hard budget 
constraints on them, by encouraging FDI and by lowering the entry barriers for new 
businesses.  The number of these businesses should be, outside of agriculture, about 0.5 
million per 10 million of the population, and the small and medium size enterprises 
should eventually account for some 50-60% of GDP. 
(iv) The inflation rate need not, and initially should not, be very low, but it must not be high 
(not more than 40% p.a.), and it should be seen to be converging to the EU level. 
(v) A dis-inflation policy should involve all the key macroeconomic components:  fiscal, 
monetary, the exchange rate and (when applicable) wages and benefits.  Given the close 
link between budget deficits and money growth in transition countries, a tight fiscal 
policy is necessary.  But it may not be sufficient, and other policies should be used in 
supporting roles.  The cost of dis-inflation is lower if the monetary authorities are 
politically independent.  Although an extreme solution, currency boards can be useful. 
(vi) The choice of an exchange rate regime is not very important from the point of view of an 
anti-inflation policy, but it helps to have, at some point, a moderately or even fully 
flexible regime, in order to provide the private sector with better information about the 
exchange rate risk and so establish a better defence against speculative capital inflows 
and an excessive growth of private foreign debt. 
(vii) The essential institutional basis for a stable macroeconomic environment includes, apart 
from an independent central bank, a solid regulatory framework for financial institutions: 
banks, insurance and pension funds, and stock exchanges. 
(viii) To attract foreign direct investment and eliminate capital flight, external credibility is 
vital.  In order to build up this credibility, the exchange rate should be competitive most 
of the time to ensure that international reserves are high in relation to imports and foreign 
debt, especially short-term debt. 
(ix) The fiscal policy, in order to be consistent with the stability objective, should aim to meet 
the Maastricht criteria with respect to the general government budget deficit and public 
debt.  However, if the policy is also to serve developmental objectives, it should 
additionally aim to keep taxes (and therefore public expenditures) low in relation to GDP 
and, within public expenditures, should favour spending on education and infrastructure 
at the expense of social transfers, defence and subsidies. 
(x) The high rate of structural unemployment requires changes in the labour code to increase 
flexibility of labour markets, e.g. by reducing hiring and firing costs.  It also requires an 
active role of governments in education and training. 
 
These ten lessons overlap with the following conclusions reached by Charles Wyplosz in 
his own recent survey:  it has paid to start early and move fast; macro-stabilisation is a pre-
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requisite for growth; the exchange rate regime is largely irrelevant for dis-inflation; and 
microeconomic foundations/structural reforms are important for both stability and growth24. But 
the matters which I am emphasising additionally, are the links between policies and growth of 
the new private sector, and the importance of the exchange rate policy for competitiveness, 
credibility and stability. 
 Recent comparative empirical studies of enterprise performance, in CIS countries on the 
one hand and in the more successful countries on the other, attempt to  identify the key 
underlying factors.  According to S. Johnson, J. McMillan and C. Woodruff, macroeconomic 
stability is not sufficient for private sector growth, and an essential institutional feature for 
entrepreneurship to develop is the presence of a legal system sufficiently strong to secure 
property rights25. Such a feature is, however, probably only one of several necessary conditions.  
After all, the legal system is the same throughout Hungary or Poland, but private sector 
development is still weak in the countryside and small towns, and heavily concentrated in the 
capitals and major cities where the supply of labour skills and infrastructure facilities is high and 
where there are more individuals with entrepreneurship abilities. 
 
 
7. What Are the Long-Term Growth Prospects for Transition Economies? 
 
In most of these countries, the institutional reforms of the1990s have created a microeconomic 
and institutional environment conducive to the effective use of their entrepreneurship capital.  In 
such countries, the magnitude of international technology transfer can be assumed to be related 
positively to both capital accumulation and the development gap.  This transfer may also be 
expected to be greater in countries which succeeded in creating and maintaining a stable 
macroeconomic environment. 
 Elsewhere I have reported the results of an empirical test of such propositions, using the 
post-WW2 data for 20 countries in Western Europe, Latin America and the Pacific rim26. These 
regression results are as follows: 
 
  gY= -2.22+0.195(I/Y)+5.63 log10(yUSA/y)-5.92 log10(1+gp)  (4) 
         (-3.6)   (7.9)          (14.5)                  (-6.8) 
 
where t-ratios are indicated in parantheses, and where R2=0.80.  In this relationship, the time unit 
is a 10-year period, and gY is the percentage growth rate of GDP, I/Y is the gross 
investment/GDP ratio, y is the per-capita GDP at purchasing power parities, and gp is the 
percentage rate of inflation (of the GDP deflator) divided by 100, all variables being 10-year 
averages. 
 In the regression equation, log(1+gp) equals approximately gp (expressed as a fraction of 
100), so (4) tells us that an increase in the trend rate of inflation by a percentage point reduces 
the trend growth rate of GDP by 0.06%.  The inflation rate is strongly correlated with the 
inflation variance, so the latter may also serve as an instrumental variable for instability factors. 
                                                
24 C. Wyplosz, “The Ten Years of Transformation:  Macroeconomic Lessons”, March 2000, CEPR DP No.2254. 
25 S. Johnson, J. McMilan and C. Woodruff, “Entrepreneurs and the ordering of institutional reform:  Poland, 
Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine compared”, Economics of Transition , vol.8(1)2000,1.36. 
26 S. Gomulka (1999), “Growth Convergence:  A Comment on Warner”, London School of Economics, mimeo, 
forthcoming in a book edited by L.Orlowski and to be published by Elgar. 
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 For those transition economies which are EU candidates, the ratio yUSA/y equals about 4, 
and log 4=0.6.  Thus, according to this Gomulka-Dumas equation, the catching-up factor 
contributes now about 3.3 percentage points to their growth of GDP.  For a EU candidate country 
with the I/Y ratio in the range of 20 to 25% and the inflation rate 10 to 15%, our growth equation 
predicts a GDP growth rate in the range from 4% (for I/Y equal to 20% and gp=15%) to 5.4% 
(for I/Y equal to 25% and gp  =10%). A further increase of the I/Y ratio by 5 percentage points, to 
30%, would raise the growth rate to 6.4% and a reduction of the inflation rate by 7 percentage 
points, to 3%, would raise it further to 6.8%.  However, after a decade of growth at between 5 to 
7%, the ratio yUSA/y would decline from the present level of 4 to about 3, reducing the 
contribution of the catching-up factor by 0.6 percentage points, and reducing the growth rate 
from 6.8% to 6.2%, by the year 2010.  
This exercise is not intended to provide precise estimates of the growth rate for specific 
time periods and specific countries.  The purpose is rather to estimate the potential trend growth 
rate which reflects broad and long-term experience of a group of countries thought to be 
representative of medium-developed and market-based economies. 
The estimates reported in Table 5 should be interpreted in this spirit, as an indication of 
what growth is possible for the countries listed, within the next 50 years, given the declining role 
of the ‘advantages of backwardness’ factor.  Policy options are represented by two savings ratios. 
The important role of capital accumulation in this growth projection is indicated by an 
implicit assumption that international technology transfer is proportional to investment.  This 
assumption may be realistic when the technological gap is large, in the first 20-30 years of the 
projection.  In the closing years of the period, declining returns to capital must set in, so the 
projection in Table 5 is then less realistic. 
 After the first decade of transition, domestic savings tend to be low in most transition 
countries.  This is so, essentially, for two reasons:  inherited policies of large social transfers and 
the negative effect on incomes of the transformational recession.  Following the first wave of 
reforms (liberalisation, stabilization and privatisation), the transition countries turn to 
implementing reforms and policies intended specifically to promote savings.  These include 
pension reforms, whereby state pensions are sharply reduced and private pension schemes 
established, and tax reforms intended to lower sharply both subsidies and direct taxes of 
individuals and companies. 
 The European Union candidates can also attract foreign direct investments in a volume 
that is significant in relation to GDP.  The macroeconomic risks to investors could be reduced 
further, and substantially, once the new EU members become a part of Euroland.  When this 
happens, and only then, domestic savings could no longer be a constraint on investment, and 
hence would no longer be a constraint on growth. 
 Public investments have a significant contribution to make in promoting growth in all 
those areas in which positive externalities are present.  These areas include, typically, physical 
infrastructure, research and education.  Public spending in these areas has been radically 
curtained during the first decade of the transition.  A reduction of social transfers is also needed 
for the purpose of reversing this past trend. 
 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
In all the transition countries covered by this paper, the liberalisation and stabilisation measures 
of the 1990s have been fundamental in helping to foster a rapid expansion of the new private 
sector, a contraction and restructuring of the state sector, and a profound re-orientation and rapid 
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growth of international trade.  In most of these countries, the GDP per capita was about 15% to 
30% of the level in the USA at the beginning of the 20th century, and is at about the same 
percentage level at the end of this century.  The economic transformation of the last decade has 
contributed significantly to meeting the strategic aim of creating an economic system that should 
enable these countries to make substantial progress in removing this income gap in the 21st 
century. 
 Dramatic macroeconomic imbalances and extraordinarily large structural distortions have 
been the key problems that the twenty-five post-socialist countries of Central Europe and the 
FSU inherited and had to face and solve, during the first decade of their transition.  The reform 
packages which most Central European and Baltic countries have adopted, broadly corresponded 
to the severity of the macroeconomic crisis and the magnitude of these inherited structural 
problems.  They aimed at regaining macroeconomic stability quickly, rapidly liberalising prices, 
trade and entry, and establishing an infrastructure of institutions and laws capable of servicing a 
well-functioning, competitive market economy.   The reform strategy adopted by most of the CIS 
countries embraced considerable, but less extensive PTE liberalisations, and placed rapid 
privatisation before macroeconomic stabilisation.  In those countries structural distortions were 
initially larger, private sectors smaller, and earlier market reforms more limited. These more 
hostile initial conditions had a major impact on reforms, policies and progress of transition.  
However, the differences in reform strategies between the two groups of countries and within 
each group have narrowed down considerably in the second half of the 1990s. 
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Table 1 
Population and GDP Data for Twenty Five Transition 
Countries of Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
 
No. Country Population 
(in millions) 
1994 
GDP per 
capita in 
thousands 
PPP$, 1998 
GDP 1998 
in billions, 
PPP$ 
GDP 1998 
in billions, 
USD 
PPP$/USD 
1998 
1 Albania 3.4 2.9 9.9 3.2 3.1 
2 Bulgaria 8.4 4.8 40.3 10.9 3.7 
3 Croatia 4.5 6.8 30.6 21.9 1.4 
4 Czech Republic 10.3 12.5 129 56.0 2.3 
5 Estonia 1.5 7.6 11.4 5.4 2.1 
6 FYR Macedonia 2.1 4.4 9.2 3.3 2.8 
7 Hungary 10.3 10.2 105 47.8 2.2 
8 Latvia 2.6 5.6 14.6 6.9 2.1 
9 Lithuania 3.7 6.4 23.7 10.8 2.2 
10 Poland 38.5 7.7 296 148 2.0 
11 Romania 22.7 5.6 127 38.5 3.3 
12 Slovak Republic 5.4 9.8 52.9 20.4 2.6 
13 Slovenia 2 14.3 28.6 19.1 1.5 
 CIS      
1 Armenia 3.6 2.2 7.9 1.8 4.3 
2 Azerbaijan 7.5 2.2 16.5 4.0 4.1 
3 Bielarus 10.4 6.1 63.4 14.4 4.4 
4 Georgia 5.5 3.3 18.2 5.3 3.4 
5 Kazakhstan 17 4.3 73.1 25.2 2.9 
6 Kyrgyz Republic 4.6 2.3 10.6 1.6 6.5 
7 Moldova 4.4 1.9 8.4 1.9 4.4 
8 Russia 148 6.5 962 275 3.5 
9 Tajikistan 5.8 0.9 5.2 1.2 4.2 
10 Turkmenistan 4 3.2 12.8 1.7 7.6 
11 Ukraine 51.9 3.2 166 43.7 3.8 
12 Uzbekistan 22.4 2.1 47.0 13.1 3.6 
 
Sources:  GDP per capita in US dollar  PPP terms from World Economic Outlook , October 1999, IMF 
1999. 
GDP (1998) levels in US dollars at market exchange rates are from Transition Report 1999, EBRD. 
 
 22 
Table 2 
Key Macroeconomic Indicators for CE Countries 1991-1999: 
(A) GDP-Weighted Averages and (B) GDP-Weighted Absolute Mean Deviations  
 
 Category 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 GDP growth,  
% 
         A                  
      B 
 
-10.7 
   2.9 
 
  -4.1 
    5.0 
 
-0.3 
  3.2 
 
  3.7 
  1.6 
 
  5.6 
  1.9 
 
  3.9 
  2.1 
 
  2.7 
  4.6 
 
  1.8 
  3.9 
 
2 Inflation(CPI), 
% 
      A 
      B 
 
109.9 
  77.0 
 
 183 
 208 
 
115 
131 
 
 29.9 
 14.0 
 
24.2 
11.7 
 
21.3 
11.4 
 
46.1 
54.1 
 
 12.0 
   8.3 
 
3 GG budget 
balance, % of 
GDP 
      A 
      B 
 
 
 -3.2 
  3.8 
 
 
 -4.8 
   2.6 
 
 
-3.4 
 2.9 
 
 
 -3.2 
  1.9 
 
 
 -3.0 
  1.3 
 
 
 
-3.2 
  1.3 
 
 
 -3.1 
  0.9 
 
 
 -3.1 
   1.1 
 
4 GG 
expenditures,  
% of GDP 
          A 
       B 
  
47.3 
  4.9 
 
45.7 
  6.5 
 
 44.7 
   5.2 
 
43.8 
  4.5 
 
43.4 
  4.7 
 
43.1 
  5.2 
 
43.1 
  3.0 
 
5 Gross reserves 
(months of CA 
expenditures) 
       A 
       B 
 
 
  1.9 
   0.9 
 
 
  2.1 
  1.0 
 
 
 
  2.5 
  0.8 
 
 
  3.0 
  0.9 
 
 
  4.4 
  2.0 
 
 
  3.9 
  1.7 
 
 
  4.1 
  1.4 
 
 
  4.5 
  1.8 
 
6  Broad money, 
% of GDP 
          A 
       B 
 
   
   
 
47.2 
15.5 
 
44.7 
16.8 
 
 44.6 
 16.6 
 
 44.8 
 15.2 
 
 45.7 
 14.5 
 
 44.5 
 12.4 
 
 43.8 
 117. 
 
7 Lending rate, 
% 
       A 
       B 
  
141 
196 
 
 45.9 
 26.3 
 
 35.7 
 16.4 
 
 27.7 
  9.3 
 
 45.9 
 42.2 
 
 25.4 
  9.4 
 
 24.4 
 10.0 
 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on official data, as reported in the EBRD Transition Report 1999.  The GDP 
weights calculated from Table 1, using the PPP GDP estimates. 
Notation:  Inflation is of the within-year (December to December) category. CPI stands for consumer price index. 
GG stands for general government (central, local and extra -budgetary funds), CA stands for current account. Broad 
money includes cash in circulation, current deposits and time deposits, in both domestic and foreign currencies. 
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Table 3 
Key Macroeconomic Indicators for CIS Countries 1991-1999: 
(A) GDP-Weighted Averages and (B) GDP-Weighted Absolute Mean Deviations. 
 
No. Category 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 GDP growth 
% 
 
A 
B  
 
 
-6.2 
   2.7 
 
 
-14.3 
2.1 
 
 
 
-9.6 
2.0 
 
 
-13.7 
2.6 
 
 
-5.3 
2.5 
 
 
-3.3 
2.1 
 
 
1.0 
1.7 
 
 
-2.9 
2.4 
 
2 Inflation 
(CPI) % 
 
A 
B 
 
 
 
155 
10.5 
 
 
2391 
303 
 
 
2431 
2435 
 
 
514 
471 
 
 
151 
51 
 
 
30.2 
13.2 
 
 
15.1 
8.1 
 
 
70.6 
29.4 
 
 
3 GG budget 
balance, % of 
GDP 
 
A 
B 
 
 
 
-36.5 
10.2 
 
 
 
 
-15.9 
3.0 
 
 
 
 
-10.4 
2.6 
 
 
 
-6.4 
1.1 
 
 
 
 
-7.6 
2.2 
 
 
 
-6.8 
1.9 
 
 
 
-5.1 
0.8 
 
 
 
-5.3 
1.3 
 
4 GG 
expenditures, 
% of GDP 
 
A 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64.8 
9.1 
 
 
 
45.2 
4.0 
 
 
 
44.0 
3.5 
 
 
 
35.6 
3.3 
 
 
 
 
37.1 
5.2 
 
 
 
 
38.2 
4.4 
 
 
 
35.0 
4.0 
 
5 Gross 
reserves 
months of CA 
expenditures 
 
A 
B 
 
    
 
 
1.6 
0.8 
 
 
 
2.6 
0.7 
 
 
 
2.5 
1.0 
 
 
 
2.6 
1.0 
 
 
 
2.0 
0.6 
 
6 Broad money, 
% of GDP 
 
A 
B 
 
 
  
 
39.3 
3.3 
 
 
25.4 
6.4 
 
 
19.2 
5.8 
 
 
13.7 
0.9 
 
 
12.8 
1.1 
 
 
13.9 
0.9 
 
 
16.6 
1.9 
 
7 Lending rate 
% 
 
A 
B 
 
     
 
191 
49 
 
 
65.2 
5.3 
 
 
36.6 
4.2 
 
 
39.6 
3.9 
 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on official data, as reported in EBRD Transition Report 1999.  The GDP 
weights calculated from Table 1, using the PPP GDP estimates. 
Notation:  as in Table 2.
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Table 4 
GDP Growth and Reforms 
 
   CE and Baltics        Growth %     Reforms, index 
NO
. 
         Country 1998 from 
lowest level 
 1989-1998 Liberalisation Stabilisation 
1   Albania 43.1 -14 3 5 
2   Bulgaria 3.5 -34 3 5 
3   Croatia  20.6 -22 3 5 
4   Czech Republic 12.7 -5 5 5 
5   Estonia  25.7 -24 5 5 
6   FYR Macedonia 5.3 -28 3 3 
7   Hungary 16.2 -5 5 5 
8   Latvia 14.0 -41 3 5 
9   Lithuania 19.8 -35 3 5 
10   Poland 42.5 +17 5 5 
11   Romania 1.8 -24 3 5 
12   Slovak Republic 32.9 0 5 5 
13   Slovenia 25.7 4 5 5 
       CIS     
1   Armenia 31.8 -59 3 3 
2   Azerbaijan 17.9 -56 1 3 
3   Bielarus 22.6 -22 1 3 
4   Georgia 29.2 -67 3 3 
5   Kazakhstan 0.0 -39 3 3 
6   Kyrgyz Republic 20.4 -40 3 5 
7   Moldova 0.0 -68 3 5 
8   Russia 0.0 -45 3 3 
9   Tajikistan 5.8 -58 1 3 
10   Turkmenistan 4.2 -56 1 3 
11   Ukraine 0.0 -63 1 3 
12   Uzbekistan 6.1 -10 1 3 
 
Source:  EBRD, Transition Report 1999.  Early liberalisers are given grade 5.  They are defined as countries that had 
achieved “complete price liberalisation, full current account convertability and almost complete small-scale 
privatisation”.  Late liberalisers achieved these thresholds after 1993.  They are given grade 3.  The remaining 
countries are given grade 1.   With respect to stabilisation, countries are divided into early stabilisers, those which 
stabilised before the end of 1993, and late stabilisers (all other countries).  The grades given are, respectively, 5 and 
3.
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Table 5 
GDP Growth and GDP Per Capita Ratio (USA GDP Per Capita = 1) 
For Selected Countries (1998 Is The Initial Year, T Denotes Years From 1998, S Is The Investment/GDP Ratio In Percents) 
 
 
 s=20 s=30 
             
t 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 
Russia             
gY  4.66 4.09 3.65 3.29 3.02  6.24 5.34 4.63 4.07 3.63 
y t/(1.02)t 0.22 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.55 0.22 0.34 0.49 0.65 0.81 0.96 
Poland             
gY  4.33 3.83 3.44 3.13 2.89  5.91 5.08 4.42 3.91 3.50 
y t/(1.02)t 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.47 0.53 0.58 0.26 0.39 0.54 0.70 0.86 1.01 
Ukraine             
gY  6.03 5.17 4.50 3.97 3.55  7.61 6.43 5.49 4.75 4.16 
y t/(1.02)t 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.31 0.38 0.45 0.11 0.20 0.31 0.46 0.62 0.78 
Czech Republic            
gY  3.37 3.07 2.84 2.66 2.52  4.94 4.32 3.82 3.43 3.13 
y t/(1.02)t 0.41 0.48 0.54 0.59 0.64 0.68 0.41 0.57 0.73 0.89 1.04 1.18 
Hungary             
gY  3.77 3.39 3.09 2.86 2.67  5.34 4.63 4.07 3.63 3.28 
y t/(1.02)t 0.34 0.41 0.48 0.54 0.59 0.64 0.34 0.49 0.65 0.81 0.96 1.11 
 
Source:  Author’s estimates on the basis of equation (4), and under the assumption that the USA GDP per capita will be increasing at 
a constant rate of 2% per annum. 
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